For many years Thailand has attempted to conduct industry structural reform, ownership reform and regulatory reform in its electricity and natural gas sector. Although there have been some ownership reform in PTT, a public enterprise in oil and gas sector, progress in industry structural reform and regulatory reform in the gas sector has been slow. Moreover attempts to privatize EGAT, an electricity stateowned enterprise, have failed for several times due to inconsistent government policies and protests from various interest groups.
INTRODUCTION
Thailand started to reform its energy sector before the financial crisis in 1997. The plans for energy structural, regulatory and ownership reforms were drawn up and included in the Master Plan for State Enterprise Sector Reform (the Master Plan) in 1997 with the main objectives of separating the roles of policymaker, regulator and operators and of privatizing state-owned enterprises (SOEs). Targeted to be privatized at that time were such energy-related SOEs as Petroleum Authority of Thailand (PTT), Electricity Generating Authority of Thailand (EGAT), Metropolitan Electricity Authority (MEA), and Provincial Electricity Authority (PEA).
Following the Master Plan, the government succeeded in partially privatizing PTT in 2001 but could not privatize EGAT due to the strong protests from various groups such as labor unions and consumer groups whereas the other SOEs' privatization plans were put on hold. The ownership reform was again retarded whereas energy structural and regulatory reforms have been proposed, planned and widely debated, but progress in these reforms has been very slow as well.
The most recent attempt to restructure electricity supply industry (ESI) is to employ an enhanced single buyer model. In this model, EGAT is a major power producer, a single buyer or monopsonist purchasing electricity from private power producers and a natural monopolist in transmission business. Since 1992 the private sector participation in electricity generation business has been in the form of Independent Power Producers (IPPs) and Small Power Producers (SPPs) to promote competition. Under power purchase agreements, both IPPs and SPPs sell electricity to EGAT only.
MEA and PEA are responsible for distributing and retailing activities in the areas under their jurisdiction. Hence, in the current ESI model, the majority of consumers nationwide have to depend on the services of the three utilities: EGAT, MEA and PEA.
Another major energy SOE is PTT ---a major operator in the country's oil and natural gas sector. Since more than half of natural gas consumption has always been for electricity generation, PTT, the sole gas transmission, distribution and supply operator, together with its subsidiary, PTT Exploration and Production Co., Ltd., the gas producer, has played a major role in determining the price of natural gas, which subsequently affects the cost of electricity generation.
Before the partial privatization of PTT, there were plans for structural as well as regulatory reform in the natural gas sector to promote competition and ensure nondiscriminatory treatment in the use of natural gas pipeline services. However, these plans have yet to be implemented.
In addition, no independent regulator existed and some state-owned operators still perform some regulatory functions in energy sector.
There have been debates on how to pursue these reforms process more effectively. The experiences of other developing countries show that clear legal basis and steps such as restructuring, private participation, and the establishment of regulatory bodies are necessary conditions for successful reforms (Jamasb, 2006) .
In Thailand, there have been several endeavors to push for an energy law. The recent attempt was eventually successful in December 2007 when the Energy Industry Act ---called the Act in this paper ---was passed by the National Legislative Assembly.
This law consolidates the laws relating to "ESI and natural gas transmission network" with the objectives of promoting competition and private participation and providing fair and transparent electricity and gas network access in the energy sector, and establishing an independent, transparent, and accountable energy regulator as well as providing a new regulatory framework. The principal rationale to enact this Act is to identify and separate the tasks to be appropriately performed by the policymaker, the regulator and the operators.
The question arises whether the Energy Industry Act can move the energy industry towards the main goals of this Act. This paper will analyze and evaluate key implications of the Act for the energy sector.
It starts with the political economy of energy law enactment in Thailand, followed by a survey of the Act's salient features. Then energy laws of various countries will be reviewed. A sample of countries from various continents with diverse paces of reforms was chosen in order to draw up implications of their energy laws on various issues.
Implications of the Act for industry restructuring, promoting competition and regulatory governance will be discussed. Next, a new regulatory policy tool, Power Development Fund, will be evaluated. Before concluding this paper, issues on environmental concern and consumer protection required by the Act will also be discussed.
POLITICAL ECONOMY OF ENERGY LAW
The Energy Industry Act of 2007 is not the first attempt to reform the industry. Back in 1998 during the Chuan government, under the State Enterprise Reform Master Plan which included the energy sector, a law was drafted for the first time to restructure the ESI and to establish an independent regulator overseeing the electricity industry and natural gas transmission. Clear separation of policy making, regulation and operation was an essential component of the reform and competitive markets were to be developed. EGAT was set to be corporatized and its new power plants were to be privatized, while PTT would also be privatized as a holding company owning natural gas, oil and other related businesses. These actions were expected to lead to more competition in electricity and natural gas. However, they were strongly opposed by workers unions in EGAT, and to some extent by unions in MEA, PEA, and other state enterprises. These unions are among the strongest, well-organized and most vocal labor groups in the country. Their protests against the Master Plan, and particularly against privatization created significant political pressure on the government and contributed to the delay and eventually the failure in moving the law beyond its drafting stage.
The Thaksin government took over in 2001 as a strong single-party administration, with a clear intention to privatize state enterprises by corporatizing and selling their shares in the stock market. The initial public offering of PTT was promptly implemented in 2001 and, though financially successful, was criticized as being politically manipulated with initial lots of shares unfairly allocated to government party supporters. Later on, the Energy Ministry again saw a need for an independent energy regulator and even set up an interim regulator for the electricity sector in 2005-6. In the meantime, it revived a plan to legislate the restructuring of the electricity industry and its independent regulatory framework. The original law drafted during the previous government was revised, and natural gas transmission was specifically taken out of the text, leaving electricity the only activity to be regulated.
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The revised version was sent to the Minister for his approval, but for some reason it 1 The fact that the Energy Minister during the law drafting was former President of PTT may explain why natural gas was omitted from this version of the law. But this can only be footnoted and cannot be confirmed by the authors.
was not submitted to the Cabinet before the government was toppled by a military coup on 19 September 2006.
While it is unclear why the second draft was delayed, there have always been some factors, other than workers unions' opposition, which tend to obstruct the move towards having an energy law. It has never been settled on the type of market arrangement which is suited to the Thai situation. The Master Plan suggested a competitive wholesale power pool previously adopted in England and Wales. Later when England switched to the New Electricity Trading Arrangement, policymakers in Thailand started to have second thoughts on the power pool model. Some experts also proposed a Nordic model as another alternative. Critics were quick to point to an example of market failure in California where an electricity crisis in 2000, with rolling blackouts and sky-high tariffs, was said to be caused by its 1996 electricity deregulation law and poor market design. A study commissioned by EGAT predictably recommended an "enhanced single buyer" model in which EGAT would remain the only wholesale buyer of electricity from all power plants. With different market models to be selected, and with some degree of uncertainty in the outcome of this politically sensitive reform, those politicians who had to decide chose to play it safe by maintaining the status quo, in as far as legislative changes are concerned. Only necessary changes were made within the existing laws and regulations.
Another voice against privatization comes from a group of consumer protection non-government organizations (NGO's) which campaigned against the way in which the Thaksin government handled state enterprise privatization. Citing the case of PTT share selling as an example, they argued that the government's real motive of privatization was for politicians in power to pocket huge profits from floating state enterprises on the stock market. In 2005, they succeeded in obtaining a court verdict to nullify the corporatization process of EGAT on the grounds that it was not in full compliance with the Corporatization Law. This represents a serious setback for the government in pushing for a reform with legal backing.
The Act being examined in this study is in fact the result of the third attempt to legislate energy reform. Dr. Piyaswat Amaranand, Energy Minister in the Surayut government and former Director-General of the Energy Policy and Planning Office, wasted no time in carrying out a pro-reform mandate, with an energy reform law being high on his agenda. A drafting committee, appointed in December 2006, was headed by a senior official from the Energy Ministry, and included representatives from relating government agencies (Energy Policy and Planning Office (EPPO), Finance Ministry, Industry Ministry, National Economic and Social Development Board, and the Council of State), state enterprises (EGAT, MEA, PEA, and PTT), the Federation of Thai Industries, Thai Chamber of Commerce, NGO's, and some academic experts in economics, law, and engineering. Four public hearings on the final draft were held in Bangkok, Surattanee, Chiangmai, and Khonkaen, before it was submitted to the Minister and the Cabinet. Despite a strong protest by the labor unions against the draft, the government approved and forwarded it to the National Legislative Assembly, which passed the bill in December 2007. Being an appointed and not elected government probably explains why such a politically sensitive law can be pushed through within a relatively short time period.
SALIENT FEATURES OF ENERGY INDUSTRY ACT 2007
As discussed in the previous section, there have been some attempts to draft the Act since 1998. Some have failed due to various reasons. This paper will focus only on the recent attempt to draft the Act in 2007.
The key rationale for energy legislation follows the government's energy industry restructuring policy to separate the roles of policymakers, regulators and operators in the energy industry from each other. This legislation has been designed to provide the paradigm shift for regulatory reform. The major aims are to establish a regulatory organization, and a regulatory framework and to centralize regulatory tasks under one body.
With the belief that when a regulatory institution and a regulatory framework are in place, competition, efficiency and private participation will be enhanced. Therefore, this Act does not explicitly provide any sections on vertical or horizontal unbundling and designing of electricity and natural gas markets. The policy on industry restructuring reform is left to the government's discretion.
Most countries have legislation covering establishment of regulatory body and framework. Only few countries such as India and the Philippines specify functions of each electricity activities, namely generation, transmission, distribution and supply, and its market design in their laws. As shown in Table 1 , most countries prefer to establish multi-sectoral regulatory body regulating both electricity and gas sector under a single legislation. However when it comes to the area of regulation, competition and market design, most countries have separate laws for each sector, as in South Africa, Singapore, Belgium, and Denmark. On the other hand, some countries do not have any provisions related to market design at all, for example Croatia and Thailand.
The key objectives and policy guidelines, as stated in Sections 7 and 8 of Thailand's Energy Industry Act, are summarized in Table 2 . The main objectives of the Act are to promote supply-side efficiency and energy security, to promote competition and to protect consumers' benefits and environment. Policy guidelines are set to achieve these objectives accordingly.
Key features of the Act
As shown in Table 3 , the Act attempts to separate the authority and duties of policymaker from the newly established regulator, called "Energy Regulatory Board" (the Regulator). The main duties of the Energy Minister are to recommend a policy on energy industry structure to the Cabinet and to consider power development plan, investment and operational plans of the Regulator and the budget of the Regulatory Office for submission to the Cabinet for approval; and to propose various policies on energy industry operation and Power Development Fund to the National Energy Policy Council (NEPC). According to the Act, a policymaking task in this industry is undertaken by the multiple government agencies including the Cabinet, the Minister and the NEPC.
The key feature of the Act is to establish the Regulator and to centralize regulatory tasks under one agency. The authority and duties of the Regulator cover most of regulatory tasks including supply-side regulatory tasks such as licensing, maintaining energy security and reliability, monitoring of energy business operation, issuing regulation on energy industry operation and equipment standards and quality, promoting knowledge and awareness in relation to energy among public and promoting energy efficiency and use of renewable energy.
However, the authority and duties of the Regulator do not include direct tariff determination and regulation of energy network systems. The regulatory tasks in these areas are limited to approval of tariff set by licensees. As for energy network system, the tasks are limited to monitoring the codes and conditions to utilize the network stipulated by the Energy Network System licensee. The Regulator will not have an authority to establish these codes and conditions whereas Energy Network System licensees are entitled to do so.
Another key feature of the Act is consumer-side regulatory tasks, particularly consumer protection via energy service standard establishment and enforcement, as well as consumer protection through the use of the Power Development Fund. The effectiveness of these tasks will be enhanced by having a Regional Energy Consumer Committee representing energy consumers in each area.
IMPLICATIONS FOR INDUSTRY RESTRUCTURING AND PROMOTING COMPETITION
Few countries directly and clearly stipulate in their energy legislation the ESI structure employed after enacting the legislation. For example, as shown in Table 4 , in the case of Mexico, a single buyer model is established by law in 1992.
Although some countries such as India, the Philippines and New Zealand, do not specify the ESI model to be employed after enactment of the law, they separate and specify functions of generation, transmission, distribution and supply licensees, while establishing the electricity wholesale market and setting market rule and third party access. These imply that these countries intend to gear their electricity sector toward more a competitive structure. However, it should be noted that the intention of the law is not always achieved within a short period of time, especially in the area of ESI restructuring. India and the Philippines enacted the law in 2003 and 2001, respectively. They have gradually reformed the structure of electricity supply industry by increasing private participation but are still operating under a single buyer model.
For those countries which have fully liberalized their electricity supply industry such as UK, Argentina, Brazil, Chile, Columbia and Peru, regulation on the naturalmonopoly transmission and distribution activities through a regulated third party access is employed.
The ownership reform is rarely stipulated in the energy law. As shown in Table  4 , the only country in the sample, The Philippines, has Chapter V in Republic Act No. 9136 (2000) on privatization of the energy state enterprise. As for the other countries, state enterprises in this industry were mostly partially privatized, particularly in upstream and downstream businesses. These countries usually have privatization laws applicable to state enterprises to be privatized. In most countries, network activities were publicly owned due to its natural monopoly characteristics. To promote competition in such countries as Argentina and Brazil, cross ownership between generation, transmission and distribution activities are precluded.
As for Thailand, according to the Act, the energy industry structure is a policy issue and will be determined and considered by the Cabinet. The Act does not clearly stipulate the energy industry restructuring policy toward a market-based regime. It does not contain explicit measures conducive to promote competition and to change from the enhanced single buyer model to a multi-buyer model. One of the reasons for pushing the Act through without any feature of energy structural reform is an urgent need to establish a regulatory framework in this sector. To avoid creating protests against the Act, this feature is left for the Cabinet's consideration in the future. However, it should be noted that it somehow creates uncertainty on implementing energy structural reform since it is not clearly stipulated in the Act.
Although the policy on energy structural reform is out of the regulator's hand, competition in this industry can in practice be promoted through new entry and nondiscriminatory access to energy network systems.
To allow new entry, the Regulator has the authority and duty to issue licenses for different types of energy industry operation as shown in Table 5 . However, the Act does not separate the types of business into competitive and natural monopoly business to apply for different types of licensing but leave it for the Regulator's discretion. Also, the Act does not disallow multiple licenses. Hence it would be possible for some state-owned energy incumbents which presently own a competitive energy business and an energy network system, and are already endowed with monopoly and monopsony power, to retain and exercise these powers over other licensees.
To promote fair competition, the Act emphasizes as one of the main objectives the concept of nondiscriminatory and transparent practices to utilize the energy network systems, currently owned and operated by EGAT, PEA and MEA in electricity sector and PTT in natural gas sector. According to the Act, the regulator is entitled to issue license to Energy Network System Operators but its authorities over operation of energy network system are limited to monitoring any codes and conditions regarding the network systems set by the licensees and establishing the criteria and procedures for the licensees to disclose some information as shown in Table 5 .
As stipulated in a section on Energy Network Systems and Energy Network System Operators in the Act, Energy Network System Licensees are empowered to control over energy network systems. As long as the Energy Network System Licensees are state agencies, they are allowed to develop their energy network system expansion plans and present them directly to Minister of Energy for further submission to the Cabinet for approval. Thus, the licensees will be given excessive powers by the Act.
Non-discriminatory open access to the network is a prerequisite to fair competition and enables other licensees to reach consumers through a network. The rules regarding open access should be set by the regulator and be decided before issuing licensing.
ESTABLISHMENT OF REGULATORY BODY AND ITS FUNCTIONS
As shown in Table 6 , most of regulatory authorities, including Thai regulatory body, are multi-sectoral, regulating electricity, gas and/or other energy such as oil, hydrocarbons and heat sectors. Regulators from Lithuania and Uruguay also regulate non-energy sector such as water and sewage. India, Pakistan, the Philippines, New Zealand, Argentina, Brazil, Ecuador and Venezuela are countries with a single-sector regulatory body regulating only electricity sector.
The regulatory authorities have explicitly stated objectives in energy legislations which they must pursue. With regard to the regulatory objectives, economic efficiency and security of supply are core objectives of the energy regulators. Almost all of them are engaged in the promotion of competition and an environment friendly industry. India and the Philippines are specifically meant to promote socially responsible price policies and their regulators are fully authorized in regulating tariffs.
The regulators from such countries as India and the Philippines have a wide range of objectives to pursue whereas the regulators from countries such as New Zealand, Spain and Croatia have the limited number of explicitly stated objectives.
In order to pursue the objectives, regulators should have competencies to conduct the regulatory functions at least in the six most important regulatory issues: approval or determination of tariff, network access, licensing, laying down rules, dispute settlement and enforcement of their decision. As shown in Table 7 , according to their legislations some regulators are entitled and empowered to conduct all of regulatory functions such as South Africa, India, the Philippines, UK, Canada, and USA.
In some countries, the regulators lack decision-making powers and play only consultative role in certain functions. For example, Spanish regulator has limited powers and functions and plays only consultative roles to 'propose' tariff, network access regulations and rules to the Minister of Industry and does not have any decision-making power over these regulatory issues. Regulators in South American countries such as Chilean and Uruguayan have no power in relation to tariff and licensing.
The majority of regulators are empowered to decide on approval or determination of tariff, laying down rules, and dispute settlement, but some of them are fully empowered in matters of licensing and network access. Although they are not empowered to perform all functions, they are given powers to enforce their decisions, with the exception of the Spanish regulator.
REGULATORY GOVERNANCE
As shown in Table 8 , the most common way to organize the regulatory authorities is the commission-type regulator. These regulators are headed by a board of commissioners working full time with the authority. A board is composed of persons with technical, environmental, legal, finance and/or economics skills. Some commissioners have a professional background in business, environmental affair and academia. In Chile all members of the board are Ministers of State whereas three out of eight Colombian commissioners are Ministers.
These commissioners are appointed for a fixed term of at least 4 years. Most of terms are renewable. Only Thai, Indian and Italian commissioners' term is nonrenewable. Commissioners in some countries can renew their terms only once such as Spain whereas commissioners in Belgium and Argentina have no limit on the number of terms.
Some of commissioners enjoy some measure of protection against dismissal before the end of their term such as regulators in Denmark. However, in most countries members of the board can be dismissed or revoked for reasons not related to policy, for example if they or their families have conflict of interests in energy sector, or if they seriously neglect their duties.
As for the appointment procedure, Table 9 shows that in most countries the regulators are appointed by the head of the state/government: President and Prime Minister, based on recommendation and/or nomination of a selection or screening committee and/or government. Some requires approval by government or parliamentary commission. As shown in Table 10 , in countries such as France, Argentina, Ecuador and Peru, regulatory commissioners are appointed by different administrative and legislative branches of the government. In most countries, the commissioner can be removed from the office for infringement of his duties, mental or physical disability, and conflict of interest by the appointing authority or by official court. Table 6 shows that the regulatory authorities rely on either fee and charges or government budget as their main sources of funding. Only few regulators in such countries as Netherlands, Spain, and Thailand rely on both sources and other kinds of funding such as donation and tax. An external source of funding is somehow more stable than government budget because regulatory authorities are not affected by or less vulnerable to politically motivated budget cuts and fight for resources among other governmental agencies.
The regulator's decisions might be challenged through certain forms of appeal mechanisms. In most countries, decisions made by the regulatory authorities can be appealed and overturned by specialized bodies. For example, the decisions can be overturned by the Appellate Tribunal for Electricity in India and by the Trade and Industry Appeals Tribunal in Netherlands. In New Zealand, the decisions can only be overturned by courts. Spain is the country in which the decisions can be overturned by the Ministry of Industry and Energy.
Implications for Thailand
The regulatory structures and instruments employed in each country are different. Regulatory mechanisms should be devised corresponding with its institutional endowment of each country. Undoubtedly the legislation is the key attributes of institutional endowment. The regulatory governance is an important institutional means that leads to the end to ensure that all objectives set in the Act are accomplished.
Following Stern and Holder (1999) , the six aspects of regulatory frameworks which characterize the governance elements of regulation will be employed to evaluate possibility that the Act in Thailand would enhance regulatory governance in the future. It consists of three aspects that relate to institutional design: clarity of roles and objectives; autonomy and independence; and accountability. Another three aspects relate to regulatory processes and practices: participation, transparency and predictability.
Institutional design
The "roles and objectives" of the Minister and the Regulator are clearly stipulated in Thailand's Energy Industry Act. It is expected that the Act would help to reduce any possible confusion about which functions and policies are carried out by Minister and by regulator. That would make regulation more effective.
The Act provides certain degree of "autonomy and independence" to the regulator through some features.
Firstly, the Act clearly defines the qualifications, disqualifications and removal criteria of the Board members; selection and appointment process and procedure; and qualification of the Screening Committee and screening criteria. The Act also specifies a fixed term (six years) and discharge of Board members. The Board members are barred from taking any energy-related career or practice during and two years after the end of their terms to prevent a conflict of interest.
Next, the Screening Committee comprises of seven members, four of which are former bureaucrats and three of which are representatives of the Federation of Thai Industries, the Council of Engineers and a Non-profit organization. The mixture of these members raises concern with political influence of the screening and selection process.
In addition, after screening and selection process, the Screening Committee shall propose the names of the selected persons to the Minister in order to submit them to the cabinet for approval. Moreover, the Cabinet can pass a resolution to dismiss the Board member from his office. Through these procedures, independence and autonomy of ministerial regulatory agency might be weakened due to political interference in appointment process and unfair dismissal. The regulator may not be able to exercise regulatory power without being undermined by short-term political interest. All in all, this could affect the credibility of regulatory system.
Financial autonomy and independence of regulator can be promoted if regulator has secure sources of funding. The Act allow the Office to earn revenue from the execution of authority and duties as assigned to the Regulator and the Office, from subsidy allocated by the government, from donation and from revenue from assets of the Office. However, any operational plan, expenditure budget, revenue estimation, and determination of fee rates and other benefits must be presented to the Minister for approval. Any requested subsidy must be presented by the Minister to the Cabinet for approval. Although the government does not have direct control over the regulator's budget through the consolidated fund of the government, it can control and/or punish the non-conforming regulator by disapproval of the proposed budget, plan and fee.
"Accountability" of regulator will be challenged through appeal mechanism as stipulated in the Act. An energy consumer, a licensee or any stakeholder, who is dissatisfied with an order issued by the Regulator, has the right to lodge an appeal with the "Regulator itself". The decision of the Regulator will be treated as final. However, the Regulator is accountable to the government. The Board member will be dismissed from his office on the ground of misconduct, negligence, dishonesty or incompetence. Hence, there are checks and balances to control regulator's misconduct.
Regulatory process and practices
The Act allows "participation" from any to-be-affected persons, a group of persons or licensees to make representations to the Regulator through the hearing process established by the Regulator before issuing any regulations, rules, announcements or codes that will affect them except for the case of emergency or exigency to maintain the energy security of country. However it is too early to conclude how much opinions expressed in the participatory process will be taken into account in the Regulator's final decision.
The Act emphasizes on "transparency" issue by stipulating that any issuance of regulations, rules, announcements or codes and reasoning behind decisions shall be recorded and summarized into annual report of the Office and shall be disseminated through a website of the Office. For example, the formula or the methodology used in the tariff calculation and even the variables used in the tariff calculation, except that they are confidential information of the licensees, shall be disclosed. However, the major concern is the scope of transparency and area of information disclosure. The information utilized in the process of reaching any decisions or issuance of regulations, rules, announcements or codes should be disclosed as well.
Transparency is an important basis for securing more effective participation from firms, consumers and affected community. It can ensure effective accountability and predictability.
"Predictability" is crucial for firms undertaking long-term investment. The Act attempts to set objective, guidelines, regulatory framework and regulation on licensing, tariff, energy network system, energy industry operation standards and equipment standards and energy consumer protection. However some of regulations do not provide the well grounded rules and empower the licensees to set rules such as energy network system and tariff determination. There is no promise that they might be subject to sudden change due to private interest of licensees.
CONSUMER PROTECTION
Since laws on energy regulation in all countries are designed to promote efficiency and competition, it is not surprising to see that most countries not only specify "consumer protection" as one of the objectives of the laws, but some also give detailed guidelines for protecting consumer interests. Consumer complaints are handled by regulators in such countries as the Philippines, Denmark, Italy, Netherlands, the United States and Ecuador. The laws in India, Ghana and Spain require their regulators to set standards of performances/service quality for energy utilities. The Electricity Commission in New Zealand develops model contracts for consumers and even provides detailed guidelines on arrangements to assist low income and vulnerable consumers. The Utilities Act 2000 in the UK requires the gas and electricity regulator to have regard to the interests of low income consumers, the chronically sick, the disabled, pensioners and consumers in rural areas. It also establishes an independent Gas and Electricity Consumer Council with the task of seeking to resolve complaints, providing useful information to consumers, and advocating consumer interests to the regulator, the government, and utilities companies.
Compared with the laws of other countries, the Energy Industry Act of Thailand also provides relatively elaborate arrangements on consumer protection. It requires licensees to meet the technical, engineering, and service quality standards set by the regulator. In case they fail to meet the standards, they have to compensate the affected customers. Standard service contracts approved by the Regulator must be publicly displayed and used to ensure fair treatment for all energy consumers. The Act empowers the Regulator to appoint a consumer committee representing energy consumers in each region, the details of which will be determined by the Regulator. Similar to the UK's Gas and Electricity Consumer Council, this 10-person committee receives and considers complaints from energy consumers, and co-ordinate with service providers to seek remedy for consumer problems. It also gives advice to consumers and the Regulator on consumer protection issues. Besides lodging complaints to their regional committees, consumers also have the right to directly request and receive information from their service providers in cases of billing errors or other unfair treatments. If they are not satisfied with their committee's decision, they can forward their appeals to the regulator. At present, the National Energy Policy Council (NEPC) has set some technical standards, and customer service standards for MEA and PEA to follow. For instance, planned outages must be publicly announced at least 3 days in advance, and at least 90% of complaints/questions from MEA customers must be responded within 30 days by mail, and 10 minutes by phone. The effectiveness of enforcing these standards has yet to be evaluated, and it is unlikely that most customers have been informed of their rights in obtaining and demanding these service qualities. Therefore, if the consumer protection system outlined in the Act really works, we can expect that at least more consumers will be aware of these rights and some will start to exercise them.
RENEWABLE ENERGY AND ENERGY EFFICIENCY
It is interesting to note that the promotion of energy efficiency and renewable energy is one of the objectives stated in the energy regulatory laws of several countries, most of which are developed countries e.g. Netherlands, the UK, Canada, New Zealand and Spain. The Electricity Act 1998 of Netherlands requires electricity producers to promote the efficient and environmentally responsible production or use of electricity by their own companies and their customers. The Spanish Electric Power Act 1997 gives some details on how energy saving and efficiency plans should be implemented.
The laws of several countries expressly promote the use of renewable energy by providing some form of subsidy to electricity generation using renewable fuels. The UK law establishes obligation schemes for producers to rely more on renewable energy. In Spain a premium price will be paid to electricity generation installations using non-consumable and non-hydraulic renewable energies, biomass, biofuels and agricultural waste. Other countries which mention the use of renewable energy as one of their objectives are Malaysia, France, Lithuania and Croatia. In the Energy Industy Act of Thailand, one of the objectives of the law and the duties of the Regulator is to promote the use of renewable energy and other energy sources with minimal impact on the environment. As in most countries, environmental standards are also one of the criteria to be adopted by the regulator in granting a license to an operator. The law establishes a fund called "the Power Development Fund" (the Fund), which can finance the use of renewable energy and clean technologies in power generation. Other purposes of the Fund are to compensate for services to disadvantaged or rural consumers, and to finance development projects in areas affected by power generation. Contributions into the Fund are in the form of fees and fines collected from licensees, and some government subsidy. Ghana is another country which has a similar "energy fund" for the purpose of promoting energy efficiency, renewable energy, and human resource development in the energy sector.
Power development fund
The Act allows a fund to be set up to compensate those licensees who provide services to low-income consumers or remote areas at prices below actual costs. Apparently, this is to be used as a tool to support the social objective of uniform tariffs and rural electrification. The Regulator is empowered to assign licensees to extend their services into areas where supply is still insufficient. Currently, uniform tariffs are achieved through a cross-subsidy between MEA and PEA. Arrangements are made for PEA to pay for bulk power from EGAT at rates lower than those paid by MEA, so that PEA can provide power to their customers at the same prices as those paid by MEA customers in Bangkok, Samutprakarn and Nonthaburi. Below-cost lifeline rates are charged for all small household power users (not more than 150 kWh per month). To continue the uniform tariff policy under the new law, this so-called Power Development Fund is likely to replace the existing cross-subsidization scheme among EGAT, PEA, and MEA. This means that a surcharge is to be collected from MEA customers into the Fund, and at the same time a subsidy is distributed out of the Fund to PEA consumers. If the cross-subsidy is to be made transparent, contributions (both positive and negative) to the Fund must be specifically identified in electricity bills.
The Fund can also be used in financing development projects in areas affected by power generation. This is apparently aimed at reducing tensions between power plants and nearby community, making it easier to locate power plants in the future. Another purpose of the Fund is to promote the use of renewable energy and environment-friendly technologies in electricity operation.
It is expected that most contribution into the Fund is collected from licensees, who most probably pass the burden over to their customers. The fines collected from the licensees who fail to comply with the Act are also to be added to the Fund. The Act specifies that a subsidy from the government is another source of revenue for the Fund. But based on past experience, this source has the least likelihood. In terms of administration, the Fund is to be managed by the Office as an account clearly separated from its regular budget. Decisions on the contribution and expenditure of the Fund will be made by the Regulator within the policy framework of NEPC.
CONCLUDING REMARKS
The attempt to reform Thai energy sector in three facets: ownership, structural and regulatory reforms has started for a decade. However, the progress of these reforms has been slow due to various factors such as protest on privatization of energy SOEs and lack of clear legal basis and steps for regulatory and industry structural reform.
To pursue reforms more effectively, energy law is needed. In Thailand the energy law was drafted for few times since 1998 but was not yet successfully enacted for various social and political reasons. In 2006 the attempt to draft energy law was revived again. By the time of writing, the Energy Industry Act B.E. 2007 is enacted with the expectation that it could generate improvements in the energy sector.
The Act will consolidate the laws relating to ESI and natural gas transmission network with the objectives of promoting competition and private participation in the energy sector, and establishing an independent, transparent, and accountable energy regulator as well as new regulatory framework.
The Act has an almost complete set of necessary features to achieve the aforementioned objectives. It is drafted to centralize regulatory tasks under the newly established regulatory body and to create a certain degree of regulatory governance. Comparing with other countries, provisions on establishment of regulatory body and its functions together with its appointment and term revocation in Thai energy legislation provide relatively more transparent process, clearer functions and better opportunity to achieve regulatory governance than those in most countries' laws.
Moreover, this law also provides relatively good arrangements on consumer protection and introduces Power Development Fund as a new way to promote the use of renewable energy and other energy sources as well as assisting disadvantaged or rural consumers and people in areas adversely affected by the power business.
However, the Act does not stipulate a clear design for energy industry structural reform in the future. Therefore, the objective of promoting competition in the energy industry may not be fully achieved. 
Country Provisions on regulatory body Provisions on regulation Provisions on competition and market design

Multisectoral body
Sectoral bodies Multisectoral law Sectoral laws Multisectoral law Sectoral laws Electricity Gas Electricity Gas Electricity Gas
North and Central America
Canada
Provisions on regulatory body, regulation and/or competition and market design in some countries might or might not be under the same legislation. To promote energy supply security and adequacy To protect consumers' benefits in terms of both tariffs and service quality To promote competition and prevent abusive use of dominance To promote nondiscriminatory and transparent service provision of energy network systems To promote efficiency and fairness in energy industry operation To protect the right and liberty of the energy consumers, local communities, general public and licensees To promote efficient use of energy and natural resources To promote the use of renewable energy with less adverse impact on the environment Policy guideline To procure energy to adequately meet demand with good quality and security at fair and reasonable prices by employing and developing local renewable energy and indigenous energy resources for the economic, social and environmental sustainability and reducing energy import dependency To promote economical and efficient use of energy and application of efficient technologies as well as the distributed generation system in order to reduce investment, fuel costs and associated impact of energy production and consumption and to increase country's competitiveness To promote participation of the local communities and general public in energy management and monitoring to ensure that management and tariff determination are carried out with transparency under jurisdiction of regulatory body to protect consumer and to ensure fairness for all stakeholders To promote correct knowledge, awareness and behavior with relation to the economical, efficient and worthwhile use of energy among the general public To support energy operation as the basic infrastructure and to provide energy security and reliability by which state is in charge of energy network system, energy network system operator and hydro power plants and to maintain the appropriate level of fuel mix 
